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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is before the Supreme Court as a secondary 
appeal of the revocation of the Appellant's license to prac-
tice medicine as an osteopathic physician and surgeon by the 
Department of Registration. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT(S) 
An administrative hearing was held before the Division 
of Registration in January 1981. After the hearing before 
the Osteopathic Committee, the Division, on February 6, 1981, 
revoked Appellant's license for conduct that was deemed unpro-
fessional by the Committee. That Decision was appealed to 
the Third District Court of the State of Utah, and after-a 
complete review of the transcript and evidence involved, the 
District Court upheld the findings of the Osteopathic Com-
mittee and affirmed the revocation of Appellant's license. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request this Court to reject the arguments 
raised by Appellant as being improper before this Court and 
after review of all pertinent issues affirm the decision of 
the Division of Registration as affirmed by the Appellate 
(District) Court and immediately lift the stay entered by 
this Court which has allowed Appellant to continue practice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents reject Appellant's "statement of facts" as 
anything but undisputed. Appellant's facts are nothing more 
than self-serving, self-laudatory statements which have 
little to do, if anything, with the reasons for revocation. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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This matter was originally heard before the Osteopathic 
Committee in January of 1981 (R-170). Following that hearing and 
on the recommendation of the Osteopathic Committee the Division 
of Registration revoked Appellant's professional license to 
practice medicine as an osteopathic physician and surgeon for 
unprofessional con.duct. (R-169) This involved the diagno-
sis, treatment, and procedures used by Appellant. Many for-
mer patients and expert witnesses testified relative to 
Appellant's treatments and methods. After much testimony and 
deliberation, a unanimous recommendation of revocation was 
made to the Division (R 170-2). A temporary stay of the revocation 
was ordered by the Third District Court Feb~~ary 19, 1981 
pending appeal (R-8). Notice of appeal was filed February 9, 
1981. (R 2-3) A temporary order of the Court modified Dr. 
Vance's license allowing him to practice within "accepted 
medical standards of an osteopathic physician and surgeon," 
pending appeal. In July of 1981 Appellant had not pursued.-the 
appeal. On July 8, 1981 Appellant's former counsel having 
withdrawn for pecuniary reasons (R-19), Respondent entered 
a Notice to compel Appellant to Comply with the Rules of 
Procedure concerning the appeal. (R-28-34) 
During July, Respondent became aware that various sec-
tions of the Temporary Order were being violated. An employ-
ee of Appellant was deposed and an Order to Show Cause of 
Contempt was filed on the 26th day of August, 1981 (R-48). 
The District Court after hearing three of the State's witnesses, 
continued the hearing on the contempt in order to decide the merits 
of the appeal before her swearing in to the Supreme Court, 
2 
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leaving insufficient time, otherwise. Those charges are still 
pending. Thereafter, Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was filed 
(R-79, 81) and decided (R-127). Briefs on appeal were final-
ly filed in late November and on the 3rd day of December, 1981 
the District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on Appeal. 
(R-249-50). The Court found: 
and also 
"Nothing in plaintiff's Memoranda on Ap-
p7al or in the record demonstrates any excur-
sion by the Committee or the Director beyond 
the scope of the statutory authority ... u 
"The Committee was unusually cautious in its 
finding: . . . the findings . . . are based 
upon testimony in the record, and upon profes-
sional expertise of the members of the Commit-
tee. This Court may not substitute its judgment 
on factual matters for that of the fact-finding 
body unless that body has clearly acted capri-
ciously or arbitrarily, or unless its conclusions 
are unsupported by the evidence. Neither circum-
stance exist here. The record suggests that the 
committee was conservative in its findings 
rather than otherwise, and those findings en-
tirely support the recommended order entered 
by the director. That order is hereby af-
firmed." (Emphasis added) 
Following a decision on appeal in favor of Respondent in 
the Third District Court, Appellant entered an appeal before 
this Court. (R-260}. Appellant also obtained a stay of exe-
cution concerning revocation of his license in this Court, 
and is still practicing under the Order of the District Court 
of the 19th of February, 1981, more than 14 months after the 
Osteopathic Committee found that his methods were unprofes-
sional and should not be allowed in the State of Utah. 
Appellant now comes before this Court in an attempt to 
gain a second appeal on the matter after failing before the 
original, and appropriate, appellate body. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A "DE 
NOVO APPEAL". THIS COURT MUST REJECT 
ALL BUT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS. 
Though Respondents have never heard the term used before, 
it appears that the best description of what appellant is 
attempting is found in the term "De Novo Appeal." Appellant 
is petitioning this Court to reject and disregard every pro-
ceeding, brief, decision and review held in or issued by the 
District Court on appeal. In essence, appellant seeks this 
court to "start anew", or in other words, allow a "new" appeal 
as if the District Court did not render a decision. He de-
desires this to be an appeal to the Supreme Court directly from the 
administrative body, as if the District Court was not the 
Appellate Court and didn't exist. Appellant is attempting 
to have this court invent a legal procedure for purposes of 
this 11 appeal 11 that is not permitted by law and is not in 
accordance with the Utah Constitution and statutes. 
The only argument that presents a constitutional claim 
is Point II. All other arguments have no basis to 
be before this court. Two arguments (which do not allege any 
constitutional problems) were never raised before the adminis-
trative body or the Appellate (District) Court. Therefore, 
they must be rejected by this Court as this is the improper 
place to raise 11 new 11 issues. These two points are Points III 
and VI. The remainder of Appellant's arguments merely "re-
argue and rehash" the evidence that was thoroughly reviewed 
by the Appellate (District) Court. Thus, all arguments, except the 
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constitutionality under Point II must be rejected and disre-
garded as a basis for consideration before this Court. 
In supporting its position, the respondents deem it 
advisable to discuss briefly the definition of "de novo." 
Recently this court acknowledged the definition as being 
"anew, afresh, a second time." (See Pledger v. Cox, 626 P. 
2d 415 (1981)). In Pledger, the court continued to discuss 
the usage of the doctrine in the context of a 
specifically-worded drivers license statute. There, because 
of the language of the statute itself, the wording was 
interpreted to mean that the matter was "anew" where new 
evid~nce and testimony could be taken (See U.C.A. 
§41-6~44.l(b), 1953 as amended). 
The Colorado Court of Appeals also discussed the effect 
of "de novo" in the case of Turner v. Passmiller, 532 P. 2d 
751 (Colo., 1975). Therein the court said: 
"A trial 'de novo' is commonly understood 
as a trial anew of the entire evidence as though 
no previous action had been taken." (Emphasis 
added) 
The statutes of the State of Utah make it clear that in 
this case the District Court is the Appellate Court 
of all issues. Any further review from a decision rendered 
there is extremely limited in scope. In the present matter 
this Court has the limited scope of reviewing constitutional 
issues only. It is not in a position to disregard the 
efforts and review of the Appellate (District) Court and 
treat as "insignificant rubble" that which went on before. 
Appellant's attempt to "reopen" the entire appeal-even to 
the arguing of insufficiency of evidence--is a mockery of 
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the statutory procedures that have been established for 
these licensure cases. Had the Legislature desired to allow 
or prescribe different procedures it would have done so. 
The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed this question as it 
related to the lack of statutory authorization to review 
"anew" the decision of the lower court on appeal. In the case 
of Godsal v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Committee, 302 
Mich. 652, 5 N.W 2d 519 (1942) the court said: 
"In this case we are limited to a 
review of the judgment of the circuit court. 
There is no procedure b¥ which we may re-
view directly any decision of the administra-
tive tribunal. 11 (Emphasis added) 
Jurisdictions with different statutory requirements 
have not uniformly followed this position. But in Utah, 
the statutes are clear that the District Court, not the Su-
preme Court, is the appellate court responsible to decide 
the correctness of the decision of the administrative tribunal. 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-12-35.1(5) states: 
"Any person who shall feel aggrieved by any 
action of the board in denying, revoking, or 
suspending his license may within 30 days 
appeal therefrom to the district court, which 
court shall affirm or reverse the action of 
the board. 
* * * 
The district court shall affirm the action 
of the board and the director unless the court 
finds that the record of the proceedin~s reveals 
that the board and director acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily or outside the scope of their au-
thority." (emphasis added) 
Thus, appellate jurisdiction of all issues of the "recordu 
lies with the District Court, not with the Supreme Court. As 
stated in the statute, above, it is the district court that 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determines if the board or director acted "capriciously, 
arbitrarily, or outside the scope of their authority." 
Furthermore, the language of the statute clearly states 
that the court (District Court) looks at (reviews) the record. 
Record of what? Record of the administrative proceedings. What 
proceedings? The proceedings before the particular board from 
which the Director has taken his action, causing the licensee 
to claim to be aggrieved. Certainly, there is nothing in 
the specific language of the legislatively mandated procedures 
as they relate to licensed practitioners under §58-12-35.1, 
U.C.A., which could justify taking a position that the pro-
ceeding before the District Court could be other than a review 
of the record of the hearing before the Osteopathic Committee. 
While it is true that U.C.A. §58-1-36 is not entirely 
clear, the provision is a general provision applying to boards 
that do not have their own statutory procedures on appeal. 
The Osteopathic Conunittee has specific procedures to be fol-
lowed when an aggrieved licensee desires to appeal the deci-
sion of the Director of the Division of Registration. U.C.A. 
§58-12-35.1(5) specifically delineates what appellants may do 
and what jurisdiction the District Court has in determining 
the correctness of the administrative committee. Without 
question, the specific language of the statute under which 
this action was appealed and as specifically cited by Appel-
lant [See Notice of Appeal filed by appellant (R-2,3)] presents 
to the court the "record" for the court to determine that a 
fair hearing was held and that based on the record the action 
of the Conunittee was not arbitrary, capricious or outside the 
7 
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This procedure was followed by the Appellate Court (Dis-
trict Court). A decision was rendered sustaining the actions 
of the Osteopathic Corrunittee. The opinion issued by the 
court, dated December 3, 1981 and entitled "Memorandum Opinion 
on Appeal" (emphasis added; R-249-51) states in particularity: 
"Nothing in plaintiff's Memorandum on Appeal 
or in the record demonstrates any excursion by 
the Committee or the Director beyond the scope of 
their statutory authority ... 
It should be noted that the transcript of the 
hearing before the Osteopathic Committee consists 
of six volumes, numbering 1189 pages. The Court 
has read the entire transcript, and examined all of 
the Exhibits described in Respondents' Filing of 
Record of Board Hearing, together with the extensive 
Memoranda filed by counsel for the parties. 
* * * * 
While it is true that some of the testi-
mony was in conflict, Dr. Vance denying some of the 
allegations made by former patients, there is an 
evidentiary basis for the Committee's findings, and 
no basis for a claim of denial of due process. The 
Committee was at liberty to make its own judgroen~ 
on credibility. 
* * * * * 
... This Court may not substitute its judg-
ment on factual matters for that of the fact-finding 
body unless that body has clearly acted capriciously 
or arbitrarily, or unless its conclusions are unsup-
ported by the evidence. Neither circumstance exists 
here. The record sug9ests that the Committee was 
conservative in its findings rather than otherwise, 
and those findings entirely support the recommended 
Order entered by the Director. That Order is hereby 
affirmed." (Emphasis added). 
Respondents encourage the court to review the entire 
Opinion. What is desired to be emphasized is that the Appel-
late Judge reviewed everything, pondered deeply and made her 
decision after much thought. This decision "on appeal" 
(R-249) was not a "fly-by-night" decision. Her Honor specif-
ically said: "The record suggests tr C"- ,_ ~" - - -
8 
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conservative in its findings ... " (emphasis added). Re-
spondents point out that the entire record before the Court 
below, including Appellant's own brief (R-193) refers to the 
matter being before the District Court "on appeal." 
Rule 8l(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pocedure specifically 
states that those rules apply to administrative matters (appeals, 
etc.) unless there is specific statutory language to the con-
trary. Taken literally, as it should be, and if U.C.A. 
§58-12-35.1(5) did not exist, then the argument could be made 
that the appeal would be to the Supreme Court. But this is 
not the case. U.C.A. §58-23-35.1(5) is clear that the Dis-
trict Court, not the Supreme Court, has the responsibility, 
obligation, and jurisdiction to make the appellate decision. 
Had the Legislature intended it to be otherwise, the 
statute would have placed that responsibility on the Supreme 
Court by statute as it has done in numerous other instances. 
For example, Decisions of the Utah Liquor Control Commission 
(U.C.A. §32-1-32.6), Industrial Commission (U.C.A. §35-1-83) 
and the Public Service Commission (U.C.A. §54-7-16) are appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court. In the case of the Tax Commis-
sion, the Legislature has given two options: obtain a trial 
de novo in District Court or go directly to the Supreme Court 
(U.C.A. §54-24-2). 
Thus, it is seen that the jurisdiction for appeal lies 
with the District Court. The appeal was heard (consisting of 
a review of the entire record made before the Osteopathic 
Committee), a decision rendered, and only issues of constitu-
tional import can now be raised before this body. The Utah 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, provides that appeals 
from Justice courts lie to the District Court "on both ques-
tions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions 
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District 
Courts on such appeals shall be final, except in cases involv-
ving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." (empha-
sis added). 
This court has ruled in numerous cases that it will not 
review the evidence again, but limits its review from appeals 
to the District Courts to constitutional issues only. In the 
case of State v. Robinson, 23 U.2d 78, 457 P. 2d 969 (1969) 
the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal _o_f a misdemeanor 
conviction "on its own" because the constitutionality of a 
statute was not challenged. That appeal, as is the case in 
this instant appeal, is based on everything but the challenge 
of a statute. The Court said: 
"The appellant was convicted of a mis-
demeanor in a justice of the peace court. He 
appealed to the District Court where on a trial 
de novo, he was again convicted. He now at-
tempts to appeal to this court and claims error 
below in that the court improperly received evi-
dence at the trial. He makes no contention that 
the statute under which he is charged is invalid. 
[Quotes Article VIII, Section 9] 
This court on a number of occasions has held 
that in cases such as this the decision of the 
district court is final and that a further appeal 
would not lie except where the validity or consti-
tutionality of a statute is invoked." (Emphasis 
added. ) 
Also, the Legislature amended U.C.A. §78-4-11 in 1977 and 
in 1981 as it relates to appeals to the District Court from 
the Circuit Court. There as well, the decision is final. 
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Though the constitutional provisions cited above do not 
expressly include administrative appeals, there is no valid 
reason why the procedures for cases arising in administrative 
agencies should be any different. To say there is a differ-
~ ence is a great injustice. Under the prohibition of a right 
a· to appeal to this court would be individuals who could lose 
their right to liberty by being placed in jail, as a result of 
a conviction before the Justice or Circuit Courts and yet 
allowing those with, for example, a day's suspension of regu-
latory licenses to appeal to the Supreme Court, after having a 
District Court affirm the decision of the regulatory body. In 
the P!esent case, although it is a revocation, instead of a 
limited suspension, the legal rationale and issues are still 
the same--the appellant has no right to a 11 de novo appeal. 11 
It is not even allowed in other appeals from the District 
Court by statute and constitution as discussed above. 
Based on the foregoing, respondent contends that the 
appellant has had his appeal and has lost. He is not entitled 
to a second appeal. He has not claimed the invalidity or un-
constitutionality of any statute. All of the issues except 
two have been briefed, argued and ruled on in the Appellate 
(District) Court. The two issues that were not raised and 
argued below are points III and VI. They were never raised 
below, are not argued to be a denial of any constitutional 
rights and this court in numerous cases has established the 
most basic premise before it that new issues cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal (and in this case for the first 
time on a second appeal)! These issues were also never 
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raised at the hearing before the Osteopathic Committee. Cer-
tainly, at this point of time, Appellant has "waived" these 
issues. They cannot be allowed at this point even if the Court 
allows other issues of this appeal to be heard. 
In essence, Appellant's "appeal" is improperly before 
this body and should be dismissed. This court should not review 
again all of the evidence that has already been reviewed by 
the Appellate Judge and ruled on. Further, the Court should 
treat this case no differently than those under Article VIII, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution. There have been no 
challenges to the constitutionality of statutes, and, there-
fore, no appeal lies. Lastly, the claim of_~nadequate regu-
lations has been waived on two occasions. No matter what 
this Court decides as to the other arguments, this issue 
should be rejected by this court as untimely and inappropriate. 
The proper course of action for this court is to dismiss 
this appeal for lack of any jurisdiction over the purported 
"appeal" to this body. If the Court does believe it has the 
right to hear some argument it should be limited only to the 
constitutionality of the Board proceeding as alleged in its 
make-up. All other arguments are inappropriate and should not 
be considered. 
Respondents, however, not knowing the view of the court 
on these issues, deem it advisable to respond to all argu-
ments even though they feel this Court should not review 
them. As such, they will be treated accordingly. 
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POINT II: 
THE PARTICIPATION OF DR. GREENWOOD ON THE 
OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE DID NOT INVALIDATE OR 
MAKE VOID THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant begins his attack on the decision of the Osteo-
pathic Committee by adulterating both the findings of the 
District Court and the actual situation that presented it-
self. By propounding that interpretation, Appellant is at-
tempting to confuse the issues before this Court--issues 
that were fully briefed and ruled on earlier. 
The record is void of any "admission" that Dr. Greenwood 
was not qualified to sit as a member of the Committee. Ap-
pellant presents.that position as one of the undisputed "facts" 
of the case. (See Appellant's Brief, Page 4.) Respondents 
have consistently maintained and the Court so found that Dr. 
Greenwood was a "de facto officer who acted under color of 
law and authority" (R-149). As such, the Court found that 
as a "de facto officer" she was authorized to sit on the 
Committee and rule on the issues presented to it in this 
case. 
The entire argument of Appellant as presented by his 
Motion to Dismiss (R 79-80) and the accompanying Memorandum 
(R 83-91) centered around residency and licensing require-
ments "within" the State of Utah. In essence, Appellant 
cites U.C.A. §58-1-6 as the basis for some "monstrous" rea-
son which precludes Dr. Greenwood from being able to render 
any opinion at all as to the propriety of Appellant's ac-
tions. This position is absurd. 
Nowhere has Dr. Greenwood's competence, professional 
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ability, knowledge, or credentials even been questioned. In 
fact, Appellant hasn't even done so in this appeal. Appel-
lant knows that Dr. Greenwood, a practicing psychologist as 
her specialty in Osteopathic Medicine, is eminently qualified 
and knowledgeable in the field of Osteopathic Medicine. She 
recieved her degree from the College of Osteopathic Medicine 
in Des Moines, Iowa, in June of 1968 and has been licensed 
in and practiced in Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin and Utah 
continually since July of 1969. (R. 141-144.) If anything, 
the fact that she has had experience in Osteopathic Medicine 
in three other states (Missouri, Iowa and Wisconsin) before 
coming to Utah to live, adds credence to th~ position that 
she has a broad understanding of theory and practice-in her 
profession. 
In support of this position, Respondents refer to the 
leading authority in the area of a physician's care and 
knowledge in going from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In 
Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (1964), a San Francisco Physician 
was called as an expert witness regarding medical practices 
in Moab, Utah. Certainly, here, the discrepancies of the 
size and sophistication of jurisdictions are obvious. Riley 
held that a physician has adequate knowledge to testify as 
an expert witness in a case if he is a physician in the 
community or similar corrununity. The San Francisco physician 
qualified under this definition to present expert testimony 
for situations in Moab, Utah. 
Certainly, Dr. Greenwood had the experience and knowledge 
from similar corrununities such as Des Moines, Iowa (roughly 
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equivalent to the communities here) to be qualified to sit 
as an expert in peer review. Medical knowledge and theory 
are fast becoming, and in many respects have become, cosmo-
politan in nature, being uniform in all areas of the country. 
Respondent maintains that Dr. Greenwood was qualified 
in every way professionally to sit on the Board. The record 
substantiates this fact and Appellant himself does not 
dispute it. 
In essence, a highly qualified physician sat "de facto" 
under color of authority to review the evidence in the 
original hearing below. Respondents deem it extreme]_y 
important to point out to ·this Court that it._wasn't just any 
"Tom, Dick or Harry" that was pulled off the street ro 
"fill" the Board position. Never has Dr. Greenwood's compe-
tence or professional qualifications been questioned. 
With this keenly in mind, Respondents now point out 
that all Appellant could do to attack the Committee's deci~ 
sion is cite a five year licensure rule which can wel.l. be 
seen as a procedural dinosaur, that has no bearing on the 
correctness of a decision and itself has been seen by the 
legislature as a requirement having no bearing on the sub-
stantive outcome of cases heard by committees. This require-
ment was repealed by the Utah Legislature in the 1981 Session. 
The Court did find in its Order that based on the 
residency and licensure requirements as per Utah Code Ann. 
§58-1-6, she was not qualified to "be appointed." (R.-149.) 
Nonetheless, the Court held, as previously stated, that Dr. 
Greenwood sat as a "de facto" member. Her qualifications 
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professionally qualified her to sit "de facto" and render a 
fair decision with the other members of the Committee. 
Appellant's brief is essentially a restatement of his 
memorandum accompanying the Motion to Dismiss in the Court 
below. Only two cases not cited in that memorandum have been 
added here. Nonetheless, Respondent deems it necessary to 
respond with basically the same argument and cases as it did 
below so this court can be fully advised of Respondent's 
position. 
Counsel for Appellant himself advocated a position before the 
District Court that he has now changed. The Court and counsel 
for Appellant had a lengthy dialogue about this matter where 
counsel took a different position. 
Appellant cites 1 Am.Jur. §69 (Appellant's Brief, Page 9) 
declaring before this body that the decision is void. Yet 
before the District Court, he maintained: 
MR. WALKER: But in saying that our statement 
is that therefore it was not a duly constituted 
committee, therefore jurisdiction never vested 
in that corrunittee. 
THE COURT: Well, if that is true, then 
there was no jurisd1ct1on to do anything 
that that board has done during the entire 
period that Dr. Greenwood has sat on it. 
MR. WALKER: Your Honor, that is the whole 
point. The case law says that it may be voidable 
at the instance of an aggrieved party. 
* * * THE COURT: If I rule that that decision 
was void for lack of JUr1sd1ct1on, then there 
is no more jurisdiction, every order that 
the board has entered is likewise void. 
MR. WALKER:. Your Honor, quoting the 
case that they cite in their brief, --
THE COURT: Let me be sure I understand 
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It! 
your position first. Do you claim that 
that the order is void for lack of juris-
diction, or do you simply claim that it is 
voidable on some due process grounds? 
MR. WALKER: We say that it is voidable. 
In other words, we have no idea what the 
position of that committee is in dealing 
with anything else. We are merely saying 
that by the case law that this decision is 
voidable by the court. 
THE COURT: Well, then your argument 
is not a jurisdictional argument? It's 
a due process argument. Because I don't 
see how you can argue where there's no 
jurisdiction you have only got a voidable 
order. If there is no jurisdiction there 
is no basis for proceeding. 
* * * 
MR. WALKER: ... I think the other actions 
by that board have not aggrieved anyone. If 
they have licensed people, if they have 
passed standards, there has no one been aggrieved, 
and that's why the case law says that it 
can be raised by the person aggrieved. 
(R. 291-2, 298; emphasis added.) 
The above establishes several things: first, Appellant 
maintains that Dr. Greenwood could sit and act. As he 
said above, the Committee could make 11 standards 11 that 
could affect many, many people. Then in the same breath 
he says it can't. Second of all, by saying the order is 
only voidable and not void, jurisdiction vests and the 
question of due process goes to the "fairness" of the 
hearing. In this matter, the fairness is totally 
substantiated. Mr. Walker maintained that the order was 
not "void." If the order is not void (as counsel admits) then 
there is no requirement that the order or any decision 
everbe declared void. 
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Appellant has not shown where there has been any denial 
of any right that has "tainted" the decision. Appellant 
cites State of Utah in re LGW, 638 P.2d 527 (Utah, 1981) 
claiming there was no existence of an "appropriate 
tribunal." By his own admissions, above, the Committee had 
jurisdiction. One wonders whether Appellant would 
claim the decision void had the Committee ruled in 
his favor? To declare it voidable at his choice must have 
some restriction. That restriction is that at no point at 
the hearing level was the issue ever raised. One cannot 
remain silent and only after an adverse decision claim there 
was some error which "voided" a decision not_liked by the 
party. 
The law on this entire matter is well estab1ished. 
Appellant has mistated both statutory and case iaw. The 
jurisdiction of the Committee is clearly established by 
statute. The Committee acting as a unit was acting as an 
arm of the State, and its actions as the record shows were 
competent and just. This was pointed out very clearly in 
United States v. Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1945) 
wherein the Court stated: 
A person actually performing the duties 
of an office under color of title is an 
officer de facto, and his acts as such 
officer are valid so far as the public or 
third parties who have an interest in them 
are concerned, [cites omitted] and neither 
his eligibilit~ to appointment nor the valid-
ity of his official acts can be inquired into 
except in a proceeding brought for that 
purpose. (Emphasis added.) 
The North Carolina Supreme Court spelled out this posi-
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tion in more detail in the case of In re Wingler, 231 N.C. 
530, 58 S.E.2d 372 (1950): 
For all practical purposes, a judge de 
facto is a judge de jure as to all partieS-
other than the State itself. His right or 
title to his office cannot be impeached in a 
habeas corpus proceeding or in any other 
collateral way. . . . So far as the public 
and third persons are concerned, a judge de 
facto is competent to do whatever may be done 
by a judge de jure. In consequence, acts 
done by a judge de facto in the discharge of 
the duties of his JUd1c1al office are as 
effectual so far as the rights of third 
persons or the public are concerned as if he 
were a judge de jure. 
Appellant is attempting to collaterally attack actions by 
a 11 de facto" board member who acted under color of title 
after.decisions were rendered and not directly on a prospective 
basis as indicated above. 
Dr. Greenwood was sworn in as a board member and 
acted as such at the hearing. Her "color of title" is 
further established by the certificate issued verifying 
this fact. (R. 139.) 
Respondent has found numerous cases from many 
jurisdictions sustaining the actions of public officials 
and/or administrative officers and members whor though not 
properly sitting according to law (de jure), were in fact 
sitting under color of authority (de facto). Such is the 
case here. No cases have been located "invalidating" those 
based on the arguments pressed by Appellant. 
In Schaffield v. Hebel, 192 S.W.2d 84 (Ky, 1946), 
the Court of Appeals said the following: 
An officer de facto is to be distinguished 
from a mere usurper or one not having some 
color of title to the office, and to be 
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one whose title is not good in point of law 
but who is in fact in the unobstructed possession 
of an office and is discharging those duties 
in full view of the public in such manner and under 
such circumstances as not to present the appear-
ance of being an intruder or usurper. 
* * * 
This is in accordance with the general 
rule that the exercise by an officer de facto 
of authority which lawfully appertains to the 
office of which he has possession is as valid 
and binding as if exercised by an officer de 
jure, and an act by the one has the same 
force and effect as an act of the other so 
far as it is for the interest of the public 
or of third persons. (Emphasis added.) 
In 1978, the North Carolina Court discussed this 
issue in the case of People v. Beach, 242 S.E.2d 796 (N.C. 
1978): 
A usurper in office is distinguished from 
a de facto officer in that a usurper takes 
possession of office and undertakes to act offi-
cially without any authority, either actual or 
apparent. Since he is not an officer at all 
or for any purpose, his acts are absolutely 
void, and they can be impeached at any time in 
any proceeding. [Citations omitted.] The acts 
of a de facto officer are, however, valid as 
to the-public and third persons. Norfleet v. 
Staton, supra. Thus, "So far as the public and 
third persons are concerned, a judge de facto is 
competent to do whatever may be done by a JUdge 
de jure. In consequence, acts done by a jud~e 
de facto in the discharge of the duties of his 
judicial office are as effectual so far as the 
rights of third persons or the public are con-
cerned as if he were a judge de jure .. (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is exceedingly clear that Dr. Greenwood was not a usurper 
and therefore her acts as a sitting member of the Board cannot 
be challenged now. Her acts stand as they relate to Dr. 
Vance. 
Again, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in Sheldon 
v. Green, 77 P. 2d 114 (Okla., 1938): 
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Having come to the conclusion that until the 
filing of the opinion in State ex rel. Williams v. 
Ba~so~, supra, .he was a de facto officer, the next 
principle applicable is that the acts of a de facto 
officer are as binding as those of a de jure officer. 
This principle is well recognized, and applies as 
thoroughly to the office of judge as it does to 
other public offices. (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed this issue 
in the case In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103 (Utah, 1927), 
where challenge was made to a District Judge sitting on the 
Supreme Court to temporarily "fill-in" because of the death 
of a Supreme Court Judge. The court soundly rejected the 
arguments raised against the District Judge as follows: 
... though it be assumed that Judge 
McCrea was not a judge de jure, he certainly was 
a judge de facto. That he was qualified as a dis-
trict judge to sit in the Supreme Court in some 
contingencies is not disputed. That he was desig-
nated by the Supreme Court to sit, and that he 
sat and participated in the case in pursuance 
thereof, is also not disputed .... Under such 
circumstances Judge McCrea was at least a judge 
de facto, if not a judge de jure, and the decision 
concurred in by him is as binding on the re-
spondent as though Judge McCrea had been judge 
de jure. (Emphasis added.) 
The cases are even more numerous in sustaining the de-
cision of the Committee. Dr. Greenwood, though not acting de 
jure in all aspects, was indeed acting de facto, and that 
decision is as binding as if she had been sitting de jure 
with the necessary years of residency. Extended periods of 
residency for voting and other rights have been struck down 
by the courts as having no reasonable connection with those 
practices. Certainly, Dr. Greenwood was and always has been 
"competent" from her schooling and experience to sit in judg-
ment in such a case. Appellant is really arguing an insig-
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nificant point in hopes of clouding the more important posi-
tion that in every way Dr. Greenwood is professionally quali-
fied. As alluded to before, the complained of Committee mem-
ber is not someone "pulled off the street." 
Appellant has cited only two new authorities in sup-
port of his entire claim that were not presented below. 
The first is Central Bank and Trust v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 
14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972) which stands for the proposition 
that courts will not interfere with the decisions of admin-
istrative tribunals unless it appears that they have acted 
in excess of their powers. Interestingly enough, the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah in Brimhall stated: 
"Our duty is to look on the whole evidence 
in the light favorable to the determination made 
by the bank commissioner and he trial court, 
and to sustain them if there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence to justify doing so. In 
the field of administrative law the assumption 
is indulged that the administrator (or admin-
istrative tribunal) possesses superior knowl-
edge and expertise because of specialized train-
ing and experience, and the focus of interest 
within the particular field. For this reason 
the well-established rule is that courts in-
dulge him considerable latitude in the deter-
mination he makes on questions of fact and also 
in the exercise of his discretion with respect 
to the responsibilities which the law imposed 
upon him; and they will not interfere there-
with unless it appears that he acted in excess 
of his powers, or that he so abused his dis-
cretion that his action was capricious or arbi-
trary." 
This statement goes not only to the powers of the admin-
istrative body but also to the reasons an individual is made 
a member of such a body. The "superior knowledge and exper-
tise because of specialized training and experience" as 
evidenced by Dr. Greenwood's excellent medical background 
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and record would be proof that she was "qualified" to serve 
upon the Osteopathic Committee, even though the specific -
licensure time period within the State of Utah was not met. 
The other new authority cited is Stahl v. Reinggold 
County, 187 Iowa 1324, 175 N.W. 772, (1964), which is cited 
along with In re Weston Benefit Assessment Special Road 
District, 294 s.w. 2d 353 (Mo. App. 1956) as a footnote to a 
statement in American Jurisprudence, §69 (p. 864). The dis-
cussion of the American jurisprudence article concerns the 
actions of officers specifically prohibited by statute from 
acting in an administrative capacity. An examination of the 
Stahl and the In re Weston Benefit cases will show that the 
intent of the Legislature in specifically prohibiting an in-
dividual from acting in an administrative capacity must be 
present. In In re Weston a member of the Board had a pe-
cuniary interest in land being purchased by the county. The 
statutory section in question provided that uno judge or 
county court shall sit in any cause or proceeding in which 
he has a personal interest or is related to either party". 
That section is a clear and specific statement of the Legis-
lature disallowing an individual for specific reasons the 
right to act in an administrative capacity. Also, in Stahl 
as annotated in the American Law Reports, a member of 
an administrative body held land in a drainage district which 
would be greatly increased in value by the action of the ad-
ministrative body. It was stated in that case that 
"An express statutory requirement that of-
ficials establishing a drainage district 
shall be disinterested was not necessary to 
render invalid the acts of interested offi-
f"'i;::i_lc: II 
23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clearly the subject of the annotation in American Jurispru-
dence makes clear that actions of officials who have personal 
or pecuniary interest in the subject of the administrative 
body's actions, even thugh not specifically prohibited by 
statutes, are void. There is no connection between that 
annotation and the case at hand. Dr. Greenwood had no 
personal or pecuniary interest in this matter and the stat-
ute which is relied on by appellant did not specifically 
prohibit the actions of officials becuase of their residency 
or the period of their licensure. It merely stated a time 
period for which appointments should be.made. 
Adding to the theory that a de facto official's_ opin-
ion should not be attacked on statutory grounds is the doc-
trine stated in Board of Medical Registration and Examina-
tion of Indiana v. Armington, 178 N.E. 2d 741 (Ind., 1962). 
In this case, a decision of the Board was questioned after 
the conclusion of the hearing, on appeal, because a member 
of the Board should not have participated in the hearing. 
The court stated: 
Although the appellee was aware of the 
fact that Dr. Elkenberry had preferred charges 
against him by reason of the notice he received 
from the board which stated such fact appellee 
failed to make an~ prompt objection to the board 
member participating in the proceeding at the 
time of the hearing ... it would not render the 
proceedings of the board in which he partici-
pated void, but . . . merely voidable. In such 
case disqualification may be waived. It is 
the general rule that unless objection is made 
at the earliest opportunity to the right of the 
person claimed to be disqualified to act it 
will be deemed waived. (Emphasis added.) 
This position has been followed in other jurisdictions 
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as well. The Illinois court said in Commissioners of Union 
Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Smith, 233 Ill. 417, 84 N.E. 376 
(1908): 
In this view of the matter, Binder was 
not competent to act as a commissioner in 
spreading the assessment. The objection which 
we have sustained is one which must be made 
before the judgment of confirmation is en-
tered. If not so made, it is deemed waived, 
and will never thereafter be of any avail. 
If the assessment has been spread by commis-
sioners who own land in the district and has 
been confirmed without any objection being 
filed which raises the question of their com-
petency, the judgment of confirmation is valid 
and binding, precisely as it would have been 
had the commissioners owned no land within 
the district. (Emphasis added.) 
(See a.lso: Carr v .. Duhme, 78 N.E. 322 (Ind., 1906). 
In a more recent case, the Oklahoma court entertained 
an appeal from the lower court challenging the right of a 
judge to conduct a preliminary hearing when, as here, the 
claim was made that he did not qualify. (Bennett v. State, 
448 P. 2d 253 (Okla. Cir., 1968)). The court stated: 
We are of the opinion, and therefore hold, 
in the light of Rath v. LaFon, supra, that the 
acts of Judge Porter in conducting the preliminary 
hearing on the 28th day of July, 1965, and 
holding the defendant bound over to the Dis-
trict Court, were acts of a de facto judge having 
the same statutes as the acts of a de jure judge. 
Moreover, we are of the further opinion that 
in order to preserve this question, the defend-
ant should have challenged the jurisdiction of 
Judge Porter in the trial court, excepted to 
the ruling of the trial court, preserved this 
in his Motion for New Trial, in which event we 
would have the question properly before us for 
review on appeal, for we have repeatedly held 
that only those questions which were raised in 
the trial court and on which adverse rulings 
were made and exceptions taken, and which are 
then incorporated in a Motion for New Trial and 
assigned as error in the Petition in Error, 
will be considered on appeal. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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(See also Board of Medical Registration v. Armington (supra)). 
Though some of the cases deal with judges, the applica-
bility to the administrative field is obvious and spelled 
out by the courts themselves as stated in the cases cited. 
The record is perfectly clear that no objection was ever made 
at the administrative level as to the qualifications of 
Dr. Greenwood. 
In the case at hand, Appellant knew that Dr. Greenwood-
had not been licensed in the State of Utah for five years 
preceding her appointment. Dr. Vance approved the licen 
sure application, personally signing his name authorizing 
the issurance of the license on June 6, 1978 ~as chairman 
of the Osteopathic Committee (R 140, 144). Appellant al-
lowed the hearing to proceed for five days with this knowl-
edge and never objected to the make-up of the Committee. 
Under the cases stated above, the Appellant has clearly waived 
his right to object to the make-up of the Committee and sub-
jected himself to their scrutiny by his informed silence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly mandated that one 
who remains silent, and allows a court to entertain error or 
approves what takes place, cannot later come forward and com-
plain of the error he himself allowed. The court held in 
the case of Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 
Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 347 (1943): 
A party who takes a position which either 
leads a court into error or by conduct approves 
the error committed by the court, cannot later 
take advantage of such error in procedure. 
Cases on this subject are also numerous, but respondent sees 
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no necessity of citing more. By admitting that the order is 
only "voidable" and not "void", this Court requires one to 
protect his position by timely objection. Such objection was 
never raised, and appellant cannot now claim the order is 
"voidable" in spite of his silence. 
Further, the Motion of Appellant should be denied, if 
for no other reason than the same Committee would hear the same 
testimony as it did previously. With the 1981 legislative 
amendment doing away with residency, Dr. Greenwood quali-
fies in every respect to sit on the Board and continues to 
sit. The three who heard the original case, in addition to 
two o~hers, (Committee of five was instituted) would make 
the decision if remanded. For judicial and administrative 
economy, it would appea that the remanding of this matter to 
the same Board who heard the case originally would be a fruit-
less waste of time, energy and public funds. 
Several courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court, have ruled that the same judges and the same adminis-
trative boards may rehear matters on remand with the claim of 
prejudice not being allowed to stand. In the Board of Med-
ical Examiners v. Steward, 102 A. 2d 248 (Md., 1954), the 
Maryland court held: 
But in the absence of a constitutional 
or statutory provision to the contrary, the 
judge who presided at the trial of a case 
which is reversed on appeal and remanded for 
a new trial is not disqualified to retry the 
case. 
And as to the specifics of that case, the court said: 
This general rule, which has always been 
accepted as applicable to judges in Maryland, is 
undoubtedly likewise applicable to members of 
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administrative agencies, for usually the pro-
cedure of administrative agencies is not as 
formal and strict as that of the courts. 
The court cited a previous Washington case to sustain its 
statements: 
Thus, in Sutton v. City of Washington, 4 
Ga. App. 30, 60 S.E. 811, where the City Council 
had convicted a person of unlawfully keeping 
intoxicating liquors for sale, it was held that, 
after the case had been remanded for a second 
trial, the Council was not disqualified from hear-
ing the case again. 
As stated previously, the Supreme Court has already 
answered the question of propriety in such a situation. In 
the case N.L.R.B. v. Donnelly, 309 U.S. 219, 67 S.Ct. 756 
(1947), the Court said: 
Certainly it is not the rule of judicial 
administration, that, statutory requirements 
apart, see Judicial Code, § 21, 28 U.S.C. §25, 
28 U.S.C.A. § 25, a judge is disqualified 
from sitting in a retrial because he was re-
versed on earlier rulings. We find no warrant 
for imposing upon administrative agencies a 
stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be dis-
entitled to sit because they ruled strongly 
against a party in the first hearing. 
Respondent is aware of no statute that precludes the same in 
the State of Utah. Once again it is pointed out that this 
"committee of Experts in the Field" ruled on "unprofessional 
conduct"--something Dr. Greenwood was admittedly qualified 
to decide. 
The statute cited by the Appellant as the basis of 
his Motion has been amended and now has no requirement of 
"time licensed in Utah" for membership on the Committee 
(U.C.A., § 58-1-6, as amended, 1981). Thus, the Committee, 
under current law would be the same that heard the initial 
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five days of testimony. The witnesses would be similar and 
the record, which is voluminous, would have to be restated 
as they were before, all for the sake of making a second 
"record." Under current law, Dr. Greenwood is sitting "de 
jure" as well as "de facto" and would be sitting on the Com-
mittee at the time of rehearing. 
The best interests of the public and all parties con-
cerned would clearly not be served if a remand was made on 
the grounds claimed by Appellant. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS 
IN THE REVOCATION OF HIS LICENSE. 
The requirements of an administrative body to assure an 
individual due process in the State of Utah, was stated in 
the case of State of Utah in re L.G.W., supra. In that de-
cision the Court stated that the requirements for due process 
are: 
"(l) the existence of an appropriate 
tribunal; (2) inquiry into the merits of 
the question presented; (3) notice of 
the purpose of inquiry; (4) opportunity to 
appear in person or by counsel; ( 5) ·fair 
opportunity to be heard; and (6) judgment 
rendered in the record thus made. 11 
It is the position of Respondents that in fact, Appellant 
has been afforded every one of the appropriate measures 
stated above. 
First, there has never been any claim by the Appellant 
that the matter should not have been heard by the Osteopath-
ic Committee. In fact, there is no other committee constituted 
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which is capable or authorized by law to sit in matters in-
volving osteopathic physicians and surgeons. Thus, there was 
an 11 appropriate tribunal. 11 Appellant's entire claim of "denial of 
due process" centers around the question as to the propriety of 
Dr. Greenwood sitting "de facto" instead of "de jure." As 
discussed in Respondent's Point II, above, Dr. Greenwood was 
professionaly capable and competent to render a "fair and im-
partial11 decision, which she did. No claim is made that a 
more eminent osteopath in the State of utah could or would 
have rendered a different decision. The mere lack of meet-
ing 11 residencey 11 requirements when otherwise qualified to 
render a decision that has little or no bea~ing on residency 
at all falls short of any level of constitutional import. 
Further analysis is found in Point II, above, and will not 
be repeated here. 
Second, a five-day hearing with voluminous testimony 
and exhibits was held inquiring "into the merits of the 
questions presented." Third, notice was adequate and timely. 
Fourth, Appellant appeared both in person and through com-
petent legal counsel during the entire hearing. Fifth, 
Appellant produced numerous witnesses, including himself, and 
cross-examined Division witnesses. As is seen by the record, 
Appellant was given ample opportunity and time to present his 
case. Finally, a judgment and decision was rendered "based 
on the evidence at the hearing." The Committee was very 
careful in its decision, finding specifically in 26 of the 
allegations that there was no cause of action and that in 
approximately 14 of the allegations the evidence sustained 
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a determination of unprofessional conduct {See Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of Osteopathic Committee, R 170-
172). 
There is no evidence or valid argument that the Apel-
lant was. denied any of the six requirements listed above. In 
fact, Appellant only claims a problem with "appropriate tri-
bunal" which has been adequately discussed, above. 
POINT IV 
THE TERM UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AS STATED IN THE 
UTAH STATUTES IS APPROPRIATE TO COMMON UNDERSTAND-
ING BY MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION BEING REGULATED 
AND PROVIDES FAIR NOTICE TO PROFESSIONALS OF THE 
GROUNDS UPON 'WHICH THEIR LICENSES MAY BE REVOKED. 
Appellant relies upon the case Tuma v. The Board of Nurs-
ing, 100 Id. 74, 593 P. 2d 711 (1979) to stand for the prop-
osition that specific acts must be listed to put the profession-
al on notice prior to disciplinary action of said professional. 
Tuma is of limited scope as it relates to certain "types" of 
actions. Appellant failed to cite the recent leading case in 
this area which not only establishes the standard relative to 
"unprofessional conduct 11 as a meaningful guidline, but unequiv-
ocably distinguises each case cited by him. This case, Chas-
tek v. Anderson, 83 Ill. 2d 502, 416 N.E. 2d 247 (1981), in-
volved a dentist who was charged with "unprofessional conduct" 
in the way he treated three patients. He claimed that this 
phraseology was unconstitutionally vague in that the statutes 
did not specifically state that the type of treatment he gave 
was improper. 
Appellant in Chastek cited Tuma and other cases (some 
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cited by Appellant here) to support his argum.ent that the term 
"unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" was vague and that 
the statute did not afford him advance notice of the type 
of acts that constituted "unprofessional conduct." The court 
said: 
"None of these cases, however, found 
a statute allowing license revocation for 
unprofessional conduct to be unprofes-
sional ... In none of these cases, however, 
did the acts reflect on the person's fit-
ness to practice his profession. In fact, 
several of these cases imply that the stat-
utes in question did place the person on no-
tice that conduct relating to his fitness to 
practice would fall under the statute.u 
In essence, the Court distinguishes "acts" that relate 
to one's fitness to practice from acts that-wouldn't relate to 
one's fitness to practice. Tuma involved a nurse discussing 
alternative treatments with a patient. Such discussions were 
not found to reflect upon her fitness as a nurse. 
There is no question that the acts of Appellant (i.e., 
promising recovery from terminal diseases, using absurd and 
"quackery" procedures such as Kirlian photography, hand pres-
sure diagnosis, taking images of thumbprints, etc.) reflect 
on his competence, professionalism and in essence, his fitness 
to practice. 
The Court in Chastek cited numerous jurisdictions where 
the "validity of similar statutes providing for license re-
vocation against constitutional challenges based on vague-
ness," was upheld. It cited cases from California, Arkan-
sas, Florida, Texas, Oregon, Minnesota, New York, Michigan, 
Colorado and Illinois. 
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In discussing the California case of Shay v. Board of 
Medical Examiners, 81 Cal. App. 3rd 564, 146 Cal. Rptr 653 
(1978) the court in Chastek stated: 
The court held, however, that it was unnec-
essary for a statute to enumerate specific 
acts which constitute unprofessional con-
duct. It analyzed the statute in terms of 
its purpose, which was to assure the high 
quality of medical practice. The court then 
held that although unprofessional conduct 
should not be given an overly broad conno-
tation, "it must relate to conduct which 
indicates an unfitness to practice medi-
cine." 
Respondent maintains that if every possible act like 
"cracking a raw egg on each patient's teeth and holding his 
head under water until he passes out" were codified as un-
professional conduct, there would be millions of possibil-
ities and even then, the best minds in the profession could 
not think of them all. It's like posing the question, "What 
is the largest possible number?" Once one states what he 
thinks it is, someone else only needs to add one and make 
it larger. 
The courts have realized this dilemma and have held 
that the Committees or Boards themselves determine the scope 
of the statutory language. The Oregon Supreme Court in 
Board of Medical Examiners v. Mintz, 233 Or. 441, 378 p_ 2d 
945 (1963) stated: 
"The fact that it is impossible to catalogue 
all of the types of professional misconduct 
is the very reason for setting up the statutory 
standard in broad terms and delegating to the 
to the Board the function of evaluating the 
conduct in each case." 
In commenting thereon, the Chastek court stated that the de-
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fining language of the statute was not the factor that gave 
the physician notice that his conduct was unprofessional. 
Also, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Reyburn v. Minne-
sota State Board of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 78 N.W.2d 351 
(1956) held: 
"Unprofessional conduct is of itself without 
amplification, a sufficiently definite ground 
upon which the Board may revoke or suspend a 
license." 
Relying on the cases cited above and its own analysis, -
the court in Chastek held: 
"The rationale in the cases upholding the 
statutes is that it is impossible to cate-
gorize all the acts constituting terms such 
as 'unprofessional conduct' or 'gfqss immor-
ality' . Further, terms such as -' unprofession-
al conduct are susceptible to common under-
standing by the members of the profession. 
When combined with the legislative purpose 
of protecting the public from people unfit 
to practice, the term 'unprofessional conduct' 
provides fair notice to the licensed profes-
sional and is not unconstitutionally vague. 
11 (Emphasis added) 
The Utah statute relied on in the hearing before the 
administrative body, as cited in Paragraph 5 of the petition 
(R 173), is U.C.A. §58-12-36(15) which includes the follow-
ing as a specific definition of "unprofessional conduct." 
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary 
to the recognized standards of ethics of the 
medical profession, or any conduct or practice 
which does or might constitute a danger to the 
health, welfare or safety of the patient or 
the public,or any conduct, practice or condi-
tion which does or might impair the ability 
safely and skillfully to practice medicine. 
This provision was enacted in 1969. In 1976 the act was 
amended to include the additional language: 
(17) Violation of any rule or regula-
tion of the physician's licensina board. 
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establishing a standard of professional con 
duct. 
Appellant claims that no "regulations" were promulgated 
delineating what conduct was improper. The above clearly dem-
onstrates that paragraph (15) is extremely specific and meets 
every test as discussed by the courts above. It is obvious 
that the Utah Legislature did not want to restrict the Com-
mittee and added (17). Even though there were no promulgated 
rules under (17), paragraph (15) is sufficient. Under the 
cases above, all that is needed is the term "unprofession-
al conduct" with no further definition necessary. 
the Legislature was very specific. 
Here, 
"r'n Chastek, the court in discussing the specifics of that 
case which involved only three situations said: 
"Thus, the plaintiff should be on notice 
that he could have his license revoked for un-
professional conduct that is harful to the 
health, safety and welfare of the public. We 
are not here faced with one alleged act of 
negligence. In this case plaintiff is alleged 
to have committed repeated negligent acts (3 
specific acts); clearly repeated acts of 
negligence by a detnal practitioner towards 
his patients are actions that endanger the 
health, safety and welfare of the public and 
therefore constitute unprofessional conduct. 
It is unreasonable to presume that a dentist is 
not apprised of the possibility his license 
could be in jeopardy for repeated acts of 
incompetent treatment." 
The court then went on to hold that these three acts of 
negligence constituted "repeated acts" and upheld the revoca-
tion of the license. 
It is thus perfectly clear that the Osteopathic Com-
mittee had the duty to examine the evidence and determine 
whether or not such action fit within the definition of 
11,11n1w'"'-F0 ~~.;'"' ........ , '"'"'"'""'...::i,.,...+- 11 as claimed in the petition. 
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In the case at hand the Committee found that Dr. Vance 
had, not just in three instances, but in multiple instances, 
acted in a manner which was unprofessional and medically 
unsound. 
It was the statutory duty of the Committee to make those 
decisions, and no amount of specificity in the statute con-
cerning unprofessional conduct could relieve the Board of 
that duty. As stated in Chastek, it is clearly impossible to 
catalogue all types of professional misconduct. Therefore, 
Appellant's assertion that the Committee should have estab-
lished specific standards of conduct is contrary to legis-
lative intent and without ·merit. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS OF THE OSTEOPATHIC COMMITTEE 
WERE BASED ON PROPER EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS 
AND WERE BASED UPON VALID EVIDENCE. 
Point IV of Appellant's brief reflects a complete lack 
of understanding administrative evidentiary standards in th~­
State of Utah. Qualified and competent professional indi-
viduals serve on administrative committees because no one 
better may sit in peer review to determine whether the evi-
dence is valid and supports the allegations made. The 
Committee is in essence a committee of experts who determine 
whether conduct is professional or unprofessional. In the 
case at hand the administrative committee did allow hearsay 
testimony. This is perfectly acceptable under every juris-
diction that has entertained the question. Appellant fails, 
however, to acknowledge that for every situation where hear-
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say evidence was allowed there was ample direct (non-hearsay) 
evidence to establish total credibility. The District Court 
so found in its "Memorandum Opinion" (R 249-51). 
Appellant's allegations concerning the type of testimony 
received and particularly, that of Dr. Allen J. Concors is 
nothing but a restatement of the arguments made in the lower 
court (R 211). Dr. Concors' testimony was not only signif-
icant as that of an expert witness in the area but also es-
tablished the general feelings of the medical community as 
a whole towards the practices of Appellant. Dr. Concors 
in his testimony did not admit he had a lack of knowledge 
of expertise regarding chelation therapy but stated that he 
had ne~er heard or read of it, indicating that the general 
medical community as a whole does not allow this type of 
therapy, even the respect of a theoretical basis. It again 
should be stated that the rule of Riley v. Layton, supra, al-
lows the testimony of a medical expert in any similar commun-
ity, thereby making general medical knowledge and practice 
cosmopolitan in nature. Appellant's allegation that nothing 
in the record shows that Dr. Concors had any experience or 
teaching to qualify him with knowledge or standards as "taught" 
and as "it should be practiced in the State of Utah 11 was 
clearly made in ignorance of this standard. 
All of the physicians appearing on behalf of the Appel-
lant were from California, none of whom had the qualifications, 
background or training of Dr. Concors as an expert in the area. 
It should be noted that Appellant's "expert," Dr. Halstead, 
was on probation, his license to practice having been tempor-
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arily revoked for aiding and abetting an unlicensed individual 
to practice medicine in the State of California. Yet the 
allegation of the Appellant that his three nondiscript, "emi-
nently qualified physicians" who testified as npeers" of Dr. 
Vance's as to methodology and treatments should be given 
more deference than that to Dr. Allen Concors, who came to 
the State of Utah from Florida where he was the head of a 
hospital employing both M. D. 's and D. O. 's. , is a weak- at-
tempt to say that the Committee had no business to decide 
who it would believe. such is an absurd and meaningless po-
sition. 
The record of the hearing is replete w~~h incidents where 
Appellant utilized methods and mechanisms totally foreign to 
the practice of medical doctors or osteopaths and whose diag-
nostic abilities are founded upon questionable theory and not 
scientific knowledge. Any one of these incidents would be 
sufficient fordisciplinary action. Yet, taken as a whole/ 
and through the strength of testimony by witnesses presented 
at the hearing, there is "no question" that the Committee 
acted properly in protecting the public from one who had 
proven himself unworthy of their trust. The combined total 
of Dr. Vance's actions left no choice but to revoke his 
license and deny him the privilege of carrying on his uneth-
ical and unapproved practices any longer. 
Perhaps the most potent admission of Dr. Vance that 
he has had a history of improper actions is found in an 
answer to a question by Mr. Halgren, counsel for the re-
spondent. The question and answer are as follows: 
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Q. [by Mr. Halgren] I see. Yo~ are 
aware, are you, Dr. Vance, that there is 
nothing wrong with a physician utilizing 
a tool in this office for diagnostic pur-
poses that may not be tested, provided he 
fully informs his patient of the fact and does 
not make any claim to his patient as to any 
validity it may have if he is not assured of 
its valid use, and as long as he doesn't make 
a charge for the use of that machine as a 
diagnostic tool? 
A. [by Dr. Vance] Well, this has been a 
learning experience. And as I mentioned to the 
Board earlier this morning, procedures have 
changed in the last ten years, and I hope that 
in the process I have cleaned up my act, so to 
s~eak. But I am aware now, Leon, of those par-
ticular things. (Emphasis added, T. 919.) 
The facts established that Dr. Vance had not 11 cleaned 
up his act, 11 but was, in fact, doing procedures and promis-
ing results that were not within the scope of legitimate and 
accepted medical practice. Not only had Dr. Vance had prob-
lems in the past, but he was still using questionable prac-
tices at the time charges were brought against him which 
led to the revocation of his license. 
Respondents now point out some of the many question-
able practices: 
(1) various patients testified that Dr. Vance 
used a procedure called Kirlian photography, which he described 
in testimony as: 
Coronogram is a permanent photograph re-
cording of a phenomenon referred to as the 
Kirlian phenomenon, K-I-R-L-I-A-N, which has 
to do with what is theorized as energy radiating 
from the human body. (T. 12) 
(2) various patients also testified to what Dr. Vance 
described as an autogenous.vaccine, or urine vaccine. 
(T.18, 19.) 
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(3) Dr. Vance would diagnose allergies by applying 
pressure with his hand on the patient's hand while the 
patient was thinking of different foods. Judith Sevcik, a 
perfrectly healthy individual who went to Dr. Vance for 
Channel 2 T.V. testified as to this practice as follows: 
[I] did hold out my hand and he would 
apply pressure to it as he would call out 
different foods. I remember wheat was one 
that he said I should stay away from; milk, 
refined foods. 
Q. Did he tell you how he made that 
determination based on this pressure? 
A. I believe it was just my own body 
reaction and what he felt coming through as 
he applied the pressure. 
Q. And then did he give you-a number of_ 
papers at that time showing what you should 
or shouldn't eat? 
A. Yes, he did. 
(T. 362-3.) 
This same procedure was used as well with Ilene Waters 
(T. 544-64) and Jan Stevens (T. 435-67}. 
4. Dr. Vance further treated Mrs. Sevcik for vitamin 
deficiency by taking an image of a thumbprint. She testified 
in answer to questions: 
Q. He didn't perform any tests of any 
kind, any diagnostic tests using any machines 
or instruments of any kind at that time? 
A. Okay. He didn't, but his nurses 
took an image of my thumbprint. And I'm not 
sure what the instrument was called, but it 
was to really tell what my energy level was. 
And it transferred the image to a. negative. 
I believe it was probably a polaroid nega-
tive. And the result was that I had very 
low--a very low energy level. 
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Q. Now after this thumbprint supposedly 
showed a very low energy level, did Dr. Vance 
make any comment to you or statement as to 
what that indicated to him? 
A. He mainly had indicated that I w~s . 
lacking in vitamins and min~rals. ,AI;ld t~is is--
at the time he set up a series of inJecti?ns--
vi tarnins and mineral injections for me which 
I went in and took these injections about every--
maybe two to three weeks. 
Q. Well, now was that diagnosis of low in 
vitamins and minerals made at that time on the 
basis of this thumbprint image? 
A. I believe so; on the basis of the 
thumbprint image and als what we had talked 
about. (T. 361) 
These procedures were only some of the many used by 
Dr. Vance to treat and diagnose patients that came to him. 
The re.cord contains many incidents where such procedures were 
represented by Dr. Vance and paid for by the patient as 
viable and acceptable medical treatments, but none of which 
are accepted by the osteopathic or medical communities as 
being medically sound. 
Of importance to note is that Dr. Vance, through using 
such inappropriate procedures diagnosed hypoglycemia in 
healthy individuals on several occasions. These individuals 
are as follows (Respondent will not cite the pertinent 
testimony, but will give a synopsis and refer the court to 
the transcript where testimony is found): Judy Sevcik was 
sent by a local television station to Dr. Vance and even 
took several treatments (T. 359-404); Milo Adams got sick 
after treatments and went to a medical doctor and was checked 
out as physically well (T .. 272-87); Lois Carter was treated 
by Dr. Vance when she, in fact, had no medical problem (T. 
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251-70); Ilene Waters and Jan Stevens were checked by competent 
medical doctors before going to Dr. Vance, at the request of 
the Division, and were given clean "bills of health." They 
were diagnosed as having medical problems (T. 544-64 and T. 
435-67, respectively). These lax and unprofessional practices 
accounting for such abuses of professional and medical judgment 
cannot be sanctioned. 
Further, Dr. Vance breached all professional ethics by 
requiring, permitting, and forcing an unregistered employee 
to perform intravenous injections. Atha Moss, a £armer 
employee, testified that Dr. Vance not only instructed her 
to give "I V" injections, but threatened to fire her if she 
refused (T. 341). The California courts discussed this 
exact issue in Kolnick v. Director, Bd. of Medical Quality, 
161 Cal. Rptr. 259 ( 1980). The court said: "When the doctor 
directs an unlicensed person to perform a medical. act, the 
question is not whether the unlicensed person may be disciplined 
for the act, but whether the doctor's conduct is, unprofessional 
II 
The use and sale of laetrile in Dr. Vance's office 
referred to specifically (T.940), is clearly a breach of 
professional ethics. 
Allowing a patient to be removed from a hospital in 
Wyoming and flown to Salt Lake City without consultation 
with the patient's physicians (T. 941), and knowingly promising 
to "save" the individual from what was diagnosed as Ewing's 
Sarcoma, as testified by Mrs. Nickeson (T.29), and allowing 
the callous treatment of Jim Nickeson, as stated by his 
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:e~ mother's testimony (T. 27, 59), was clearly in violation of 
professional ethics and in-and-of itself cause for the 
recommendation of the Committee. Even Dr. Vance reluctantly 
admitted in dialogue and questioning from one of the Board, 
:~ Dr. Katherine Greenwood, that it would be a good practice to 
~~ contact a person's physician before becoming involved if the 
patient was under the care of another (T. 942). 
As stated as expert opinion on the record by Dr. Allen 
Concors: 
[I]t's not unusual for people who are in a 
state of desperation or who have been labeled 
with a terminal illness to seek extraordinary 
regimes for some miraculous cure, for some 
type of magical therapy, or some type of 
magical drug that is going to cure them or 
at least prolong their life and lessen 
their agony. 
But as we all know, reputable, genuinely 
concerned physicians know better; and they don't 
offer false hope when there is no hope; and 
they don't use medical regimes that are 
unsound and unproven. And to do that is, in 
essence, to play on people's emotions and to 
premeditatedly extort money from patients 
when you know and you are trained better. 
( T. 485. ) 
Another major unapproved and unprofessional procedure 
Dr. Vance used to an extensive degree and which he has been 
using through the stay pending the outcome of this appeal is 
the use of a highly questionable and unproven procedure known 
as chelation therapy. In essence, a great majority of Dr. 
Vance's patients would receive such treatments no matter 
what was wrong with them (see testimony of the healthy people 
that went to him for treatment), but would particularly be 
used for the treatment of arteriosclerosis or atherosclerosis. 
This, as found by the Baord and as found throughout the country 
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is another violation of the ethical standards of an osteopathic 
physician and surgeon, particularly where Dr. Vance has 
represented that chelation therapy is a "miracle" treatment 
for atherosclerosis. The treatment is not a recognized and 
accepted medical treatment for atherosclorosis and its 
wholesale use for this purpose is rejected by members of the 
medical field in general. 
Appellant relied on the case of State Board of Medical 
Examiners v. Rogers, 387 So.2d 937 (Md., 1980), for his use of 
chelation therapy. However, the Rodgers case is easily 
distinguishable from the case at hand. The court in that case 
stated: 
Dr. Rodgers allowed his patients to make 
their own choice as to whether to begin this 
treatment after full disclosure that this 
methodology has not been proven effective 
... that Dr. Rodgers never claimed it was 
a cure and that there was no allegation or 
proof of fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, or 
overreacting. (Emphasis added.) 
This full disclosure never was given. Dr. Vance never told 
a patient that this methodology has 11 not been proven effective." 
In fact, the record is exceedingly clear that Dr. Vance held 
the procedure out as the "great miracle" of helping people. 
When Mrs. Nickeson asked Dr. Vance how come the doctors in 
Wyoming didn't know about this "miraculous procedure," all 
Dr. Vance could say as related by Mrs. Nickeson: "He told 
me that his method of treatment was different and it was 
new, and it was too bad that the Casper doctors didn't know 
anything about it. 11 (Emphasis added, T. 30.) 
The Rodgers decision, as restricted by the Supreme 
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~, court of Florida has not been followed or cited in any 
other jurisdiction, and stands not as effective precedent, 
but as a singular and somewhat questionable interpretation 
of the right to practice medicine. 
The Rodgers full disclosure and disclaimer standard, as 
stated by the Florida court, is clearly not applicable in 
this matter as a defense for the chelation thereapy respresented 
by Dr. Vance. The material and statements received by the pat-
ients in the Vance office did not contain such disclosures 
and disclaimers. 
A theory advance by the Rodgers case is that there is 
some kind of inalienable right to practice medicine guaranteed 
to the- populace. This theory has long sine been put to rest 
in the State of Utah. In State of Utah v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 
602 (1976), the Supreme Court stated: 
The public interest requiring the regulation 
of healing arts and the Legislature undertaking 
such regulation, it necessarily follo~i-s that 
the profession of healing is no longer a right 
under Section 58-1-1.1, but should properly 
be labelled a "privilege" under Section 
58-12-27. 
In Hoffman, the Court also stated in support of the 
Utah Medical Practice Act: 
[T]he legislature is protecting t.he people 
from the guac~s.who wo~ld dece~ve them into thinking 
they are re<?eiving ~edical rel~ef whe.n. in reality, 
they are being deprived of their money without the 
remotest possibility of cure. This type of 
c;ruac~ery also prevents people who may.be or are 
in dire need of competent aid by their either 
~elaying or foregoing of proper treatment. These 
ill people think they are being cured,. when, in 
fact, they are receiving no real help. 
The case at hand is an example of the need for competent 
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physicians to sit on the Osteopathic Committee, and to regulate 
their own profession, and when necessary, remove from_practice 
individuals who so grossly abuse the discretion allowed 
physicians so as not to allow injury to patients, but the professio 
as a whole. 
Appellant cites nothing to show or even infer that a 
wrong standard was followed. Why? Because the evidence 
dictated the correct decision. Clearly, ample direct 
testimony sustained the decision. 
POINT VI 
THE DECISION OF THE OSTEOPATHIC 
COMMITTEE WAS BASED UPON EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND SHOULD NOT BE OVER-
TURNED BY THIS COURT UNLESS IT IS-FOUND 
TO BE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
Appellant's brief for more than 25 pages is nothing but 
a verbatim transcription of Appellant's memoranda on appeal. 
(See R. 212.) It adds nothing to this appeal that was not 
already adjudicated in the lower court. The Appellant has the 
burden to establish that the decision was arbitrary, capricious 
or based wholly on unsubstantiated facts before this Court 
can act to overturn the decision. Absent such a showing the 
decision must be sustained. The established standard by 
which the Court shall judge the Committee's findings is that 
the Appellant must prove that the recommendation and the 
action of the Director was totally without basis in fact or 
that said actions were arbitrary and capricious in nature. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Petty v. 
Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (1979), stated: 
[I]t is appropriate to affirm our commitment 
to these general propositions; that an adminis-
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trative agency should be allowed a com~ari~ively 
wide latitude of discussion in performing its 
responsibilities; and that ~he Court should not 
intrude or interfere therewith unless the action 
is so oppressive or unreasonable that it must 
be deemed capricious and arbitrary or that the 
agency has in some way acted c9ntrary to th~ 
law or in excess of its authority. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This standard of review is regionally accepted and, is 
found in virtually every jurisdiction. Those in Utah's area 
that accept it are Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Nevada, 
California and Wyoming. 
The terms arbitrary and capricious as used in the 
above-stated discussions have been qualified as "[W)ilfull 
and unreasonable actions without consideration and in disregard 
of the facts or circumstances and then but wherethere is 
room for two opinions action is not arbitrary and capri-
icious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration." 
A review of the record will convince the Court that in fact, 
the Osteopathic Committee did employ the correct standard in 
the review of the evidence and that their findings were 
correct. The District Court stated in its decision (R. 250) 
that the Committee "[W]as unusually cautious in its findings 
the record suggests that the Committee was conservative in 
its findings rather than otherwise and those findings entirely 
support the recommended order entered by the director." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the Court below read the entire 
transcript numbering 1,189 pages, examined all the exhibits 
and extensive memoranda filed by both parties. (R 249-51.) 
The finding of the Court below was reflective of a complete 
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and thorough review of the action before the administrative 
body. The attempt by Appellant, at this point of the appeal 
process, to present a cursory and twisted set of excerpts 
from that voluminous transcript is nothing more than an 
attempt to cloud the real facts. The "complete" picture can 
only be seen after a complete review of the transcript as 
was made by the Appellate Court. As stated in Petty, supra, 
this court would have to find that the actions of the Committee 
were capricious and arbitrary or that the agency has in some 
way acted contrary to law or in excess of its authority. 
Appeallant has not pointed out where this is found. The 
Osteopathic Committee took the matter into qa~eful consideration 
and found from an exhaustive review of the evidence that 
Appellant was in fact guilty of unprofessional conduct and 
should have his license revoked. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is not entitled to an "Appeal De Novo. 11 The 
issues raised in his brief have been argued and decided by 
the Appellate Court. This Court should not review "anew" 
those decisions. 
The Osteopathic Committee of the State of Utah was the 
"appropriate tribunal" to review the evidence against Appellant. 
The appointment of Dr. Greenwood to sit on the Committee was 
made by Paul T. Fordham, Director of the Division of Registraion. 
Through inadvertance on his part, the residency requirements 
were not checked. She was sworn in and acted in a highly 
professional manner. No objection has ever been raised as 
to her competence to sit on "peer review". 
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Dr. Greenwood acted under color of authority ude facto 11 
and thus the decision (which had little or no relationship 
to residency anyway) must be upheld. 
Appellant filed his appeal under Utah Code Ann. §58-12-35.1(..5) 
and not under Utah Code Ann. §58-1-36. Counsel is confused. 
There is no "de novo" provided. 
The Committee is the proper body to determine whether specific 
acts fall under the definition of "unprofessional conduct" 
as alleged and defined by the statute. No independent regu-
lations listing the myriads of possibilties are necessary. 
Appellant had a proper hearing. There was no denial 
of du~ process in any shape or form. Neither the Committee 
nor the Appellate (District) Court abused its discretion 
or acted arbitrarily. Certainly the evidence sustains the 
decision of the Committee. 
· THEREFORE, Respondents strongly urge this Court to sus-
tain the decision of the Appellate Court upholding the revo-
cation of Appellant's licenses and immediately lifting the 
stay of said Order that Appellant has been continuing under--
This for the health and safety of the public. 
DATED this /~day of April, 1982. 
49 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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